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NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT

Book V of the Senate Intelligence Committee discusses Report) refers to a reported five-hour delay (6:00PM EST to 11:00 PM EST) of a Cubana flight from Mexico Coty to Havana the evening of President Kennedy's assassination, November 22, 1963. (Senate Intelligence Committee Report, April 23, 1976, p.30) The most 58 account intriguing aspect of the repor Mc Caloana Ilight delay was to await arrival at 10:30 PM EST of a pri-Thearceraft vate twin-engined aircraft, which deposited an unidentified passenger who boarded the Cubana aircraft without customs clearance and traveled to Havana in the pilot's cabin. (ibid ps. 60 -61) The Senate Intelligence Committee wrote that the Central Intelligence Agency "had no information indicating that a followup investigation was conducted to determine the identity of the passenger and had no further information on the passenger, and no explanation for why a followup investigation was not conducted." (ibid p.61)

The Senate Intelligence Committee Report raises four major Questions:

a) Did the Central Intelligence Agency which the Senate Intelligence Committee that no investigation of the November 22, 1963 Cubana flight was conducted?

- c) What were the results of the Central Intelligence Agency investigation?
- d) Were the results of the Central Intelligence Agency investigation forwarded to the Senate Intelligence Committee?

In an attempt to answer the questions raised by the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, the utilized House Select Committee on Assassinations has the following invertigative procedure

a) Conducted an extensive review of the Central Intelligence Agency files that pertain to the November

22, 1963 Cubana flights.

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b) Reviewed Tab B of the 1977 Cid Staff Report which Concerned above-cires included a section on the November 22, 1963 Cubana

c) Reviewed the February 4, 1976 Central Intelligence.

Agency letter to the Senate Intelligence Committee.

DID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WRITE THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE THAT NO INVESTIGATION OF THE NOVEMBER 22, 1963 CUBANA FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED?

After a careful review of the February 4, 1976 Central Intelligence Agency letter to the

its not just enough to say we its not just enough to say we we will buisdid we make the

Senate Intelligence Committee, the House Select
Committee on Assassinations has determined that the
Senate Intelligence's interpretation of the letter
is misleading. The Central Intelligence Agency wrote
the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Mexican
authorities were asked about the reported flight
delay, although there was no recorded response. (CIA
letter to Senate Intelligence Committee, 2/4/76)

DID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FURTHER INVESTIGATE THE ALLEGATION?

The Central Intelligence Agency conducted regular surveillance of Cubana flights, filing cable reports to Headquarters. (1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab B, p. 11) There was one unilateral CIA surveillance team (Lifica) that observed arrivals and departures of Cubana flights, reporting any unusual incidents and providing copies of flight manifests. (ibid, p.11) The Mexican authorities also had a surveillance team of its own at the airport which provided the CIA with photon graphs of passports and copies of passenger lists. tionally, telephone tap operation (ibid p.11) (LIENVOY) against the Cuban Embassy provided trans-A16/INES cripts of conversations the Cubana office and the Mexican Airport Control office. iked p.11)

WHAT WERE THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INVESTIGATION?

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DIFFERENCE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS FINDINGS

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The House Select Committee on Assassinations findings differ from those of the Senate Intelligence Committee in the following manner:

a) The Cubana flight was on the ground in Mexico
City for a total of four hours and about ten minutes.
It was not delayed five hours as reported in Book V.

( , te).

b) The Cubana flight departed at 2035 hours

Mexico City time, 55 minutes ahead of the alleged arrival at 2130 of a private flight with a secret passenger.

c)The 2035 departure also contrasts further with the Senate Intelligence Committee Report that the Cubana flight departed at 2200.

aircraft carrying a lone passenger exists. In addition, no record exists of a passenger traveling to Havana in the pilot's cabin. In view of the surveillance Coverage of the Cubana flight, it is doubtful that the alleged activity involving the private twineers and passenger would have gone unnoticed or unreported had it occurred.

WERE THE RESULTS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FORWARDED TO THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

The Central Intelligence Agency gave the

Senate Intelligence Committee only the informant

allegations. The Senate Intelligence Committee

did not review the LIFIRE or LIENVOY records. Relying

solely on the informant's allegations, the Senate

Intelligence Committee could not have reported the

story any differently.

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